Doesn't Pink's concession run the danger of undermining the role of baptism?
If some of the baptized non-culpably distrust the church, it would seem also that some of the *unbaptized* would also be in a position where their distrust of the church is *culpable.*
E.g., consider a person who believes he was baptized as an infant, raised Catholic, trusts the church etc. We then learn that this person was, in fact, never baptized. (or perhaps received an invalid infant baptism). This person trusts the Church, his reasons for trust are identical to the validly baptized. And it seems like per Pink spiritual coercion would be justified on this person. But what justifies the coercion isn't the baptism, but the post-baptism processes that engender (justified?) trust in the church.
Right?
So now the claim appears to be that coercion is justified upon those who have trust in the church. So
Your comment is fabulous and insightful. I think I agree with all of it. Pink does need to explain why the falsely baptized truster cannot be coerced by why the truly baptized truster may be. Great point.
The role of baptism in Integralist theory remains a fascinating topic. One additional point. My understanding is that for most Integralists the definition of baptism is a matter of canon law -- the Church defines what constitutes a valid/invalid baptism.
In your debate, one of the interlocutors humorously noted that ‘you can’t just go into a nursery with a super-soaker and call that a valid baptism of every infant in the hospital’ – or something to that effect. But to the non-Integralist, this fact appears as a matter of historical contingency. There’s no reason of doctrine (I think?) why the Church could not have adopted or could not adopt in the future a definition of valid baptism that greatly increases the scope of legitimate coercion. Indeed, this is why cases of infant baptism are so salient to the non-Integralist – because they demonstrate to a degree the contingency (a critic might say arbitrariness) of who is subject to legitimate coercion.
So Integralists appear subject to a kind of Euthypro dilemma with respect to the nature/definition of baptism. Could the church working through legitimate processes come to define baptism in a way that was *unjust*? If yes, then reason can determine moral constraint on the Church, and we can ask if the current definition of baptism (absence of adult consent, e.g.) violate those criteria? If no, then baptism is just defined by the processes of the Church, and is not subject to external critique.
This later conclusion may not be an issue for (some) Integralists. If one regards the Church as a supernatural/divinely inspired institution, it will just be the case that it will not define baptism in an unjust way.* But this demonstrates how many assumptions Integralism requires to respond to the justice argument:
1) It is legitimate to coerce the baptized, and
2) Baptism reliably/consistently tracks justified trust and vice versa, but also
3) The nature of baptism will (Necessarily? Reliably?) be justly defined by the Church.
Phew! That’s enough for a comment box. Make sense?
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*Similarly, it appears some Integralists regard skeptical questions about the Church as a source of trustworthy moral instruction as a kind of category error. E.g., Is the Church *in fact* a trustworthy source of moral instruction at this point in time? Is it not possible that it could fail to be in the future? If it did so fail, how would we know? These seem to many Integralists to be ill-formed. The Church just is the institution which provides trustworthy moral instruction (or at least it is when it is functioning through its legitimate processes. But this is, again, just a version of biting the bullet on a Euthyphro dilemma.
Doesn't Pink's concession run the danger of undermining the role of baptism?
If some of the baptized non-culpably distrust the church, it would seem also that some of the *unbaptized* would also be in a position where their distrust of the church is *culpable.*
E.g., consider a person who believes he was baptized as an infant, raised Catholic, trusts the church etc. We then learn that this person was, in fact, never baptized. (or perhaps received an invalid infant baptism). This person trusts the Church, his reasons for trust are identical to the validly baptized. And it seems like per Pink spiritual coercion would be justified on this person. But what justifies the coercion isn't the baptism, but the post-baptism processes that engender (justified?) trust in the church.
Right?
So now the claim appears to be that coercion is justified upon those who have trust in the church. So
Your comment is fabulous and insightful. I think I agree with all of it. Pink does need to explain why the falsely baptized truster cannot be coerced by why the truly baptized truster may be. Great point.
Thanks for responding!
The role of baptism in Integralist theory remains a fascinating topic. One additional point. My understanding is that for most Integralists the definition of baptism is a matter of canon law -- the Church defines what constitutes a valid/invalid baptism.
In your debate, one of the interlocutors humorously noted that ‘you can’t just go into a nursery with a super-soaker and call that a valid baptism of every infant in the hospital’ – or something to that effect. But to the non-Integralist, this fact appears as a matter of historical contingency. There’s no reason of doctrine (I think?) why the Church could not have adopted or could not adopt in the future a definition of valid baptism that greatly increases the scope of legitimate coercion. Indeed, this is why cases of infant baptism are so salient to the non-Integralist – because they demonstrate to a degree the contingency (a critic might say arbitrariness) of who is subject to legitimate coercion.
So Integralists appear subject to a kind of Euthypro dilemma with respect to the nature/definition of baptism. Could the church working through legitimate processes come to define baptism in a way that was *unjust*? If yes, then reason can determine moral constraint on the Church, and we can ask if the current definition of baptism (absence of adult consent, e.g.) violate those criteria? If no, then baptism is just defined by the processes of the Church, and is not subject to external critique.
This later conclusion may not be an issue for (some) Integralists. If one regards the Church as a supernatural/divinely inspired institution, it will just be the case that it will not define baptism in an unjust way.* But this demonstrates how many assumptions Integralism requires to respond to the justice argument:
1) It is legitimate to coerce the baptized, and
2) Baptism reliably/consistently tracks justified trust and vice versa, but also
3) The nature of baptism will (Necessarily? Reliably?) be justly defined by the Church.
Phew! That’s enough for a comment box. Make sense?
---------------------
*Similarly, it appears some Integralists regard skeptical questions about the Church as a source of trustworthy moral instruction as a kind of category error. E.g., Is the Church *in fact* a trustworthy source of moral instruction at this point in time? Is it not possible that it could fail to be in the future? If it did so fail, how would we know? These seem to many Integralists to be ill-formed. The Church just is the institution which provides trustworthy moral instruction (or at least it is when it is functioning through its legitimate processes. But this is, again, just a version of biting the bullet on a Euthyphro dilemma.